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STUDENT NOTE

Square Information, Round Categorization: Executive Order
13556 and Its Implementation Challenges
Austin Harris
ABSTRACT
The Obama Administration is committed to establishing an
unprecedented level of transparency and openness in order to garner the
public’s trust and ensure more effective government. Public access to
government information is essential to a democracy, and the ability to share
information across federal Executive Branch agencies is critical to the national
security of the United States. In theory, President Obama’s goal of increased
openness and transparency in government is well served by the recently‐signed
Executive Order 13556, which calls for the standardization of Controlled
Unclassified Information across the government. The goal of the new,
standardized system is to make Controlled Unclassified Information easier to
share across agencies and more accessible to the public.
However,
implementation of Executive Order 13556 faces significant challenges that will
frustrate the goals of the Obama Administration, limiting public access and the
sharing of Controlled Unclassified Information across the government until those
challenges are addressed.
Compliance with Executive Order 13556 requires that existing Controlled
Unclassified Information markings undergo a new review and designation
process, placing existing designations into new, broader categories. This process
requires intensive consideration by an examiner when attempting to place a
particular piece of information into this small group of new categories to ensure
maximum protection and shareability. The new review and designation process
and the overall goals of Executive Order 13556 demand additional funding,
personnel, and training in order to be effectively implemented. This is especially
the case where some types of currently‐existing Controlled Unclassified
Information do not fit easily into the forthcoming new categorizations.
Furthermore, local, state, tribal, and private sector partners, all of which have
done business with the government through decades of “agency‐centric”
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information protection policies, will also need to adopt new practices to ensure
adequate protection and compliance.
In addition, although Executive Order 13556’s implementation will
theoretically create a standardized system that will ensure information is not
overprotected and is easily shareable, individual agencies with different missions
and individual security professionals concerned with issues such as the “Mosaic
Theory” will continue to default to increased protection. As a result, the public
availability of Controlled Unclassified Information and its sharing among
governmental agencies will be further limited by existing individual agency
culture, the need to retrain personnel to focus on information sharing, and the
abandonment of deeply‐routed agency practices of overprotection.
Given the ever‐growing challenge to national security, protecting
information will be critical as the missions of agencies continue to expand in
scope. Public access to and trust in its government are the cornerstones of a
democracy, and balancing security interests with the free flow of information
will be a great challenge for the United States in the coming decades. While
Executive Order 13556 attempts to address this challenge, the federal
government must correct existing problems to Controlled Unclassified
Information access if Executive Order 13556’s goals are to be successfully
realized across the government.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The availability of, and access to, information across the government is
paramount to the national security of the United States and is essential to the
function of a democratic society.1 The Obama Administration is committed to
establishing an unprecedented level of transparency and openness in order to
garner the public’s trust and ensure a more effective government.2 This change
is in stark contrast to the George W. Bush Administration, which is characterized
as one among the most secretive in history.3 Striking a balance between the
need for public access to government information and protecting sensitive
information from unauthorized dissemination is essential to the national security
and democratic governance of the United States.4 At the same time, modern
threats require the ability of the Executive Branch agencies to share information
with one another while ensuring the protection of sensitive information needed
to carry out their mission of safeguarding the national security of the United
States.5
Concerned citizens or organizations in a democracy will request
government information to keep a watchful eye on how their sovereign is
behaving or to advance their own interests.6 However, an outside observer may
1

E.g., Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 399, 399 (2009).
2
Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,685 (Jan. 26, 2009).
3
Patrice McDermott, Withhold and Control: Information in the Bush Administration, 12
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 671 (2003).
4
See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Secrecy and Democracy: Who Controls Information in the
National Security State? 3–4 (N. Y. Univ. Pub. Law and Legal Theory at NELLCO Legal
Scholarship Repository, Working Paper No. 217, 2010) (describing congressional access
and broad public disclosure as “crucial for prudent national security policy”), available
at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/217/; Devin Fensterheim, He Who Protects
Everything Protects Nothing: Secrecy and Democratic National Security, WORLD AFF. REV.
Apr. 2006, at 21, 21–22 (2006) (discussing the inherent conflict between government
transparency and the need for security in certain information).
5
See Nathan Alexander Sales, Share and Share Alike: Intelligence Agencies and
Information Sharing, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 279, 279–81 (2010) (discussing information
sharing as a counterterrorism initiative “virtually everyone supports” and the efforts by
Congress and the Executive Branch to promote information sharing across the
government).
6
See Aftergood, supra note 1, at 399 (discussing the free flow of information to
interested members of the public as a prerequisite to their ability to hold elected
officials accountable); James O’Reilly, FOIA and Fighting Terror: The Elusive Nexus
Between Public Access and Terrorist Attack, 64 LA. L. REV. 809, 810 (2004) (listing the
various classes of people and organizations who submit Freedom of Information
requests).
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not be clear as to the need for information sharing across the government, or, on
the other hand, may not be certain why an agency would not be inclined to
share its information with other government agencies. The same observer will
also wonder why a democratic government would not be willing to share
information with its citizens that does not meet a sensitivity level to qualify it for
classified status. For purposes of this article, consider the following two
hypotheticals while assuming that neither piece of requested information
qualifies as classified material.
“Hypothetical One”: Prior to September 11, 2001, an agency concerned
about the Oklahoma City Bombing wants to mitigate any damage its
headquarters could sustain in an attack carried out in a similar manner. The
agency devises a list of federal buildings that it believes possess the most secure
design and damage‐mitigating features. The agency believes that, of all the
buildings listed, the Pentagon will have the best information available, but, oddly
enough, the Pentagon refuses to share particular information about its most
recent bomb‐proofing projects.
“Hypothetical Two”: A citizen is performing research on the military
installation near his home. He knows that there are munitions and ordnance
stores around the area and, concerned for the safety of his community, wants to
know the damage that could be done if a store were to detonate. He files the
proper paperwork to gain access to the information, but the military base
refuses to release the information to him.
The two hypotheticals have foundations in real world events.7 The
section of the Pentagon that sustained damage during the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks,
Wedge One, had been retrofitted as early as 1998 with heavy‐duty, blast‐
resistant windows designed to minimize damage from an explosive attack.8 In
addition, a report detailing the bomb‐proofing features of the Mark Center, a
building in Alexandria, Virginia, soon to house 6,400 Department of Defense
(“DoD”) personnel, was found available on a public government internet

7

See Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011); Greening of the Pentagon, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/epp/pubs/case/penren.htm (last updated May
12, 2010).
8
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 7 (“The first renovation efforts in the section
called "Wedge 1" included blast‐resistant windows . . . [B]ecause of the blast‐resistant
windows and other force protection measures, although horrific destruction was
endured in the Wedge 1 area, studies have shown that the newly renovated and
reinforced materials in Wedge 1 lessened the potential for greater destruction.”).
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website.9 The pages of the report were marked “For Official Use Only,” and the
posting was described as a “recipe for attack.”10
The concerned citizen in Hypothetical Two is similar to the citizen in
Milner v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy.11 Milner was focused on a Freedom of
Information Act12 (“FOIA”) request13 where Mr. Milner sought copies of the
maps depicting the blast radius of a potential explosion of the munitions and
ordnance stores around his community.14 The concerned citizen in Hypothetical
Two may submit a FOIA request in attempt to acquire the desired information,
and the Department of the Navy may be replaced by any agency holding the
information subject in the FOIA request. The Department of the Navy refused to
release the maps to Mr. Milner, believing that their dissemination would
threaten the security of the base and the surrounding community. The United
States Supreme Court, although rejecting the Department of the Navy’s initial
FOIA‐based reasoning for the withholding, remanded the case and pointed out
that other FOIA exemptions still existed.15
The information sought in both hypothetical scenarios was withheld on
the basis of its Controlled Unclassified Information (“CUI”) designation. The
reasoning for the designation (and withholding) may be based on concerns for
an unauthorized dissemination, which could provide an enemy of the United

9

Mark Hosenball & Missy Ryan, Anti‐bomb Plan for Pentagon Annex Posted Online,
REUTERS, Apr. 19, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/19/us‐usa‐pentagon‐
security‐exclusive‐idUSTRE73I6KK20110419.
10
Id.
11
Milner, 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011).
12
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
13
See Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1262.
14
Id. at 1263 (“To aid in the storage and transport of these munitions, the Navy uses
data known as Explosive Safety Quantity Distance (ESQD) information. ESQD
information prescribes “minimum separation distances” for explosives and helps the
Navy design and construct storage facilities to prevent chain reactions in case of
detonation. The ESQD calculations are often incorporated into specialized maps
depicting the effects of hypothetical explosions.” (internal citations omitted).
15
Id. at 1271 (“Exemption 3 also may mitigate the Government’s security concerns. That
provision applies to records that any other statute exempts from disclosure, thus
offering Congress an established, streamlined method to authorize the withholding of
specific records that FOIA would not otherwise protect. And Exemption 7, as already
noted, protects “information compiled for law enforcement purposes” that meets one
of six criteria, including if its release “could reasonably be expected to endanger the life
or physical safety of any individual.” The Navy argued below that the ESQD data and
maps fall within Exemption 7(F), and that claim remains open for the Ninth Circuit to
address on remand.”) (internal citations omitted).
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States access to material for part of a larger plan.16 Other pieces of CUI
information, such as those related to law enforcement investigations, are
withheld to prevent suspects from escaping capture or surveillance.17
Furthermore, an agency may choose to withhold information from release in
order to protect an intelligence source and ensure its safety and anonymity.18
This article concerns the Obama Administration’s attempt to streamline
the categorization process for CUI, Executive Order 13556 (“EO 13556”).19
Specifically, the article’s focus is on the duties outlined by EO 13556 and the
challenges to its effective implementation. CUI is defined as:
[A] categorical designation that refers to unclassified information that
does not meet the standards for National Security Classification under
Executive Order 12958, as amended, but is (i) pertinent to the national
interests of the United States or to the important interests of entities
outside the Federal Government, and (ii) under law or policy requires
protection from unauthorized disclosure, special handling safeguards, or
prescribed limits on exchange or dissemination.20

Through EO 13556, the Obama Administration hopes to improve access
to CUI for both the public and among Executive Branch agencies, thereby
increasing transparency and ensuring information needed by agencies to execute
their missions is shared across the government.21 Successful implementation of
EO 13556 would, in theory, remove the information sharing and government

16

This idea is known as the “Mosaic Theory.” It is discussed in detail in the
section entitled, “The ‘Mosaic Theory.’”
17
Michael P. Goodwin, A National Security Puzzle: Mosaic Theory and the First
Amendment Right of Access in the Federal Courts, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 179, 185
(2010) (“[T]here is little question that the effective conduct of foreign and military
affairs requires a certain degree of secrecy . . . . In some cases this is easy, such as when
public disclosure would alert the target of an investigation of the government’s interest
in him.”).
18
Sales, supra note 5, at 283–84.
19
Exec. Order No. 13,556, 75 Fed. Reg. 68,675 (Nov. 9, 2010) [hereinafter EO 13,556].
20
Memorandum on Designation and Sharing of Controlled Unclassified Information
(CUI), 44 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 673, para. 3(a) (May 9, 2008) [hereinafter Bush CUI
Memorandum]. This memorandum has since been rescinded by Executive Order
13,556. EO 13,556, supra note 19, § 6(g). The CUI Task Force recommended in its
report that the definition of CUI be simplified to “all unclassified information for which,
pursuant to statute, regulation, or departmental or agency policy, there is a compelling
requirement for safeguarding and/or dissemination controls.” PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON
CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFO., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11 (2009). [hereinafter CUI
TASK FORCE REPORT].
21
See EO 13,556, supra note 19, § 1.

172

U. MIAMI NAT’L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. [Vol. 1

transparency issues, such as those raised by Hypotheticals One and Two, unless
there is a compelling need to protect the information from dissemination.
Part II of this paper is focused on examining and discussing EO 13556 and
CUI generally. Part III traces the history of CUI information and describes the
major recent events leading to EO 13556. Understanding the historical context
of the evolution of EO 13556 is essential to the examination of its importance to
the national security of the United States. Part IV is concerned with detailing the
duties and other provisions of EO 13556. Next, Part V examines the challenges
of implementation that the government and affected parties must address to
effectively carry out EO 13556’s directives and goals.22 Recommendations follow
in Part VI; their purpose is to provide ideas, which could ease the challenges and
reduce the cost of implementation. Finally, Part VII concludes that EO 13556,
while excellent in theory, is likely to face many challenges if it is to be effectively
implemented. Overcoming those challenges requires changes to the existing
information sharing system and the granting of stronger authority, larger staff,
and more funding to the Executive Agent (“EA”) to ensure an optimum
environment for openness with security.
II. EO 13556 AND CUI
Currently, executive departments and agencies have employed an
“inefficient, confusing patchwork” of safeguards and categorizations concerning
information that is not classified23 but still requires protection or dissemination
controls, also known as CUI.24 The type of information traditionally falling under
this categorization usually concern privacy, security, proprietary business
interests, and law enforcement investigations.25 Examples include a myriad of
items, ranging from investigations of individuals with possible terrorist ties, to
business information related to the development of military hardware, to the
personal information of agency employees.26 To gauge the extent of CUI across
the Executive Branch, President Obama issued a memorandum directing
department and agency heads to, among other things, “ensur[e] that the
22

While effective public access is an important part of the CUI discussion, this paper
focuses primarily on intergovernmental and agency‐specific issues and practices that
must be addressed to ensure implementation of EO 13556. Public access will be
discussed as a means of illustration within the paper.
23
The levels of classified information in ascending order of potential damage to national
security are “confidential,” “secret,” and “top secret.” Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed.
Reg. 19,823, at 19,826 (Apr. 20, 1995), reprinted as amended by Exec. Order 13,292, 68
Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 28, 2003).
24
EO 13,556, supra note 19, § 1.
25
Id.
26
CUI TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 33–34; Cf. EO 13,556, supra note 19, § 1. See
Hypotheticals One and Two for additional examples.
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handling and dissemination of information is not restricted unless there is a
compelling need[,]”27 and to report their findings. In order to accommodate this
directive, the leadership of several executive agencies led a collaborative effort28
to seek out information currently listed as Sensitive But Unclassified (“SBU”).29
The agencies issued recommendations as to how the information could be
reassessed, and consequently, more easily accessed by the public or other
agencies.30
On November 4, 2010, President Obama signed EO 13556.31 EO 13556
establishes “an open and uniform program for managing information that
requires safeguarding32 or dissemination controls33 pursuant to, and consistent
with, law, regulations, and Government‐wide policies . . . .”34 Among all of the
executive departments and their agencies, over 10035 different categorizations

27

Memorandum on Classified Information and Controlled Unclassified Information,
2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 408, § 2(b)(ii) (May 27, 2009) [herein after Obama CUI
Memorandum].
28
CUI TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 2. The group assembling this report is
referred to as both the “Interagency Task Force on Controlled Unclassified Information”
and the “Presidential Task Force on Controlled Unclassified Information.” This paper
adopts the name, “CUI Task Force.” Special credence should be afforded to this report
as EO 13556 calls for consideration to be given to the report specifically. The agencies
involved in the assembly of the CUI Task Force report were the Department of Justice,
Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, Department of Health and
Human Services, Department of State, Office of Management and Budget, Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Archives and Records Administration, and the
Program Manager of the Information Sharing Environment. Id.
29
Most types of information meeting SBU categorization was redesignated as CUI. Bush
CUI Memorandum, supra note 20, at para. 1.
30
See CUI TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20.
31
EO 13,556, supra note 19.
32
“’Safeguarding’ means measures and controls that are prescribed to protect
controlled unclassified information.” Bush CUI Memorandum, supra note 20, at para.
3(j). “’Safeguarding’ means measures and controls to protect CUI from unauthorized
access resulting from theft, trespass, or carelessness.” CUI TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 20, at 8.
33
“Dissemination controls are instructions governing the extent to which dissemination
is permitted or limited.” CUI TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 8.
34
EO 13,556, supra note 19, § 1.
35
Some of the markings used by agencies identifying CUI include “Sensitive,” “Do Not
Disseminate,” “Eyes Only,” “Limited Rights,” “For Official Use Only,” “Research and
Development Agreement Information,” “Limited Official Use – Law Enforcement
Sensitive,” “Personally Identifiable Information – Privacy Act of 1974,” and “For Internal
Use Only.” CUI TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 33–34.
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exist for Controlled Unclassified Information (“CUI”),36 and many of these ad‐
hoc, agency‐specific policies have “led to unclear or unnecessarily restrictive
dissemination policies, and created impediments to authorized information
sharing.”37
Challenges to the access of information exist on many levels, and the
inability to transmit information across government entities has been identified
as one of the major causes in the failure to prevent the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks.38
The 9/11 Commission recognized that the United States Government has access
to an immense amount of information but has a “weak system for processing
and using what it has.”39 Recognizing this problem, the 9/11 Commission
opined, “The system of ‘need to know’ should be replaced by a system of ‘need
to share.’”40
Within the structure of sensitive government information exist two
categorizations of information—classified information, denoted within the
government by specific markings,41 and CUI. Both types of information require
varying levels of safeguarding and dissemination controls according to their
sensitivity level. The need for protection of classified information is obvious due
to its sensitive nature and the probability that its dissemination could cause
harm to the United States Government, its personnel, or its missions. However,
information categorized as CUI also requires protection, but its need for
safeguarding is not as apparent. The general examples of CUI—privacy, security,
proprietary business, and law enforcement investigations—are all types of
information that need protection from unauthorized access or dissemination.42
Furthermore, while some markings do not necessitate a clear need for
protection, some of the currently‐existing, agency‐specific markings do.43 These
include: attorney client, IT [Information Technology] security‐related, trade
secret, bomb tech sensitive, controlled nuclear information, chemical‐terrorism
vulnerability information, and protected critical infrastructure information.44

36

Id. at 5.
EO 13,556, supra note 19, at 68,675.
38
See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U. S., FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2004)
[hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY] (describing how information
could have been shared to disrupt attack plans and the call for a new focus on
information sharing across the government); Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 53.
39
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 38, at 24.
40
Id.
41
See supra text accompanying note 23.
42
EO 13,556, supra note 19, § 1.
43
CUI TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 33–34.
44
Id.
37
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EO 13556 is primarily concerned with remedying the problems of
inconsistent marking and safeguarding of CUI, unclear or unnecessarily
restrictive dissemination policies, the problem of information sharing across the
executive departments and agencies, and the lack of public transparency in the
agency‐specific CUI policies.45 Correcting these problems will bolster national
security through more effective information sharing among Executive Branch
agencies that may require CUI obtained from other agencies to accomplish their
missions. The Obama Administration’s employment of EO 13556 will serve the
goals of transparency and openness well in theory, but implementation will likely
encounter obstacles associated with the practical application of EO 13556, both
within and outside of the Executive Branch.
Writing on CUI presents unique challenges given the sensitive nature of
the subject. While a substantial level of difficulty is to be expected when
petitioning the government and its employees for information relating to
classified information, EO 13556 has indeed proven to be a challenging subject
on which to collect substantial “inside” information. Government officials will
only speak to this issue under strict non‐attributable status.46 Despite these
challenges, the extensive body of research relating to government information
and its dissemination allows for realistic recommendations to ensure effective
implementation of EO 13556.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The need for secrecy in government actions can be traced back to the
Revolutionary War.47 George Washington and his officers in the Continental
Army marked critical strategic documents requiring protection as “Secret” and
“Confidential.”48 The first systematic procedures for protecting documents
concerning “national defense” were created by War Department General Orders
No. 3 in February 1912.49 However, the current system for classified documents
can be traced to Executive Order 8381 issued by President Franklin Roosevelt in
March 1940, and in February 1950, President Truman issued Executive Order
10104, creating the classified markings in existence today.50

45

EO 13,556, supra note 19, § 1.
Given the ramifications of discussing a federal employee’s opinions on the current
administration’s efforts; that is, an employee may consider that expressing negative
comments or doubts would be career limiting.
47
Harold C. Relyea, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL 33494, SECURITY CLASSIFIED AND CONTROLLED
INFORMATION: HISTORY, STATUS, AND EMERGING MANAGEMENT ISSUES 1 (2008).
48
Id.
49
Id. at 2.
50
Id.
46
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In September 1951, Executive Order 10290 expanded the power of the
president to create secrecy policy; classified information in the interest of
“national security”; conveyed more latitude for the creation of secrets; and
granted classification authority to nonmilitary, Executive Branch entities serving
a role in “national security” policy.51 These sweeping changes, however,
suffered from extensive criticism from the press and the public, prompting
President Eisenhower to issue Executive Order 10501 in November 1953,
significantly changing the powers granted under Executive Order 10290.52 For
the next thirty years, Executive Order 10501 would serve as United States policy
on classification procedures.53 During these three decades, new Executive
Orders continued to build on these reforms until President Reagan reversed this
pattern in 1982 with Executive Order 12356.54 In April 1995, the Clinton
Administration issued Executive Order 12958, returning to the trend of reform
instituted by the Eisenhower Administration; this Order was later amended by
President George W. Bush with Executive Order 13292 in March 2003.55
The first references to SBU emerged in the 1970s.56 In 1977, President
Carter signed a Presidential Directive on Telecommunications Protection Policy57
which mandated protection of unclassified, but sensitive communications “that
could be useful to an adversary.”58 Several years later, National Security
Decision Directive 145 (“NSDD–145”)59 instructed that “sensitive, but
unclassified” information, the loss of which could negatively affect national
security interests, should be “protected in proportion to the threat of
exploitation and the associated potential damage to the national security.”60
NSDD–145 also alluded to the belief that pieces of unclassified information,
taken in the aggregate, could reveal classified or other sensitive data and

51

Id. at 3.
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 3–4.
55
See id. at 4 (detailing the changes by Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush).
56
See Genevieve J. Knezo, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL 31845, “SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED”
AND OTHER FEDERAL SECURITY CONTROLS ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION: HISTORY AND
CURRENT CONTROVERSY 11 (2004) available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL31845.pdf;
OMB WATCH, CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INFORMATION
CONTROL REFORM 3 (2009) [hereinafter OMB WATCH, CUI REFORM].
57
Presidential Directive on Telecommunications Protection Policy (PD/NSC–24), (Nov. 16
1977), http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd24.pdf.
58
Id. ¶ 2(b).
59
National Security Decision Directive 145 (NSDD–145) on National Policy on
Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems Security (Sept. 17, 1984),
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd145.htm.
60
Id. ¶ 2(b).
52
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NSDD–145 did not define the term

On October 29, 1986, President Reagan’s National Security Advisor, John
Poindexter, issued National Policy on Protection of Sensitive, but Unclassified
Information in Federal Government Telecommunications and Automated
Information Systems (“NTISSP No. 2”)62 broadening the rationale for
safeguarding “sensitive, but unclassified” information to “other government
interests.”63 “Sensitive, but unclassified” was defined as “information the
disclosure, loss, misuse, alteration or destruction of which could adversely affect
national security or other Federal Government interests.”64
However,
widespread criticism about the scope of NTISSP No. 2 and the powers it granted
to the intelligence community led to the withdrawal of NTISSP No. 2 and usage
of its definition for “sensitive, but unclassified.”65
Shortly thereafter, the Computer Security Act of 198766 granted the
National Bureau of Standards, since renamed the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (“NIST”), the authority to enhance government‐wide computer
security standards and guidelines.67 The Computer Security Act of 1987 defined
the term “sensitive” as:
[A]ny information, the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or
modification of which could adversely affect the national interest or the
conduct of Federal programs, or the privacy to which individuals are
entitled under section 552a of title 5, United States Code (the Privacy
Act), but which has not been specifically authorized under criteria
established by an Executive order or an Act of Congress to be kept
secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.68

61

Id. intro., para. 2. This idea is now called the “Mosaic Theory.”
John M. Poindexter, National Policy on Protection of Sensitive, but Unclassified
Information in Federal Government Telecommunications and Automated Information
Systems (NTISSP No. 2) (Oct. 29, 1986), http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/8706.pdf.
63
Id. § II (Other government interests are those related, but not limited to the wide
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Government by its citizens.”).
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Id.
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Knezo, supra note 56, at 13.
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Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100–235, 101 Stat. 1724 (1988).
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Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100–235, § 2(b) 101 Stat. 1724, 1724
(1988).
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Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100–235, § 3(d)(4), 101 Stat. 1724, 1727
(1988).
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The Computer Security Act of 1987 also granted agencies the discretion
to identify which information in their systems was sensitive, identify the risks of
any release of sensitive information,69 and placed the responsibly for protecting
sensitive information on the agencies.70 Five years later in 1992, NIST issued
guidelines to agencies to ensure protection of sensitive information.71 These
guidelines stated that the interpretation of the Computer Security Act of 1987’s
definition of sensitive resided with the agencies and that a “risk‐based approach”
should be utilized by the “owners” of sensitive information to determine which
protections to place on such information.72
Since 1987, various agencies have used the definition of “sensitive”
provided by the Computer Security Act of 1987 to identify SBU information,73
while others have expanded it in various ways.74 Such expansions included
information exempted from disclosure under FOIA and information deemed
sensitive by an individual agency based on its particular activities.75 The lack of a
uniform definition of “sensitive but unclassified” eventually led to an
equivalence within the Department of Defense between “sensitive,” as defined
in the Computer Security Act of 1987, and the term “sensitive but unclassified”76
and ultimately led to the emergence of the multitude of markings in existence
today.77
CUI sharing and safeguarding problems have existed for decades, but the
9/11 terrorist attacks were the catalyst for addressing and attempting to correct
many of these problems.78 In 2004, President Bush signed into law the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (“IRTPA”)79 which called for
the President to “issue guidelines for acquiring, accessing, sharing, and using
information, including guidelines to ensure that information is provided in its
most shareable form . . . .”80 IRTPA also established the Information Sharing
69

Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100–235, §§ 6(a)–(b), 101 Stat. 1724, 1727
(1988).
70
Knezo, supra note 56, at 14.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 16.
74
Id. at 38.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 22
77
See generally id. at 16–23 (discussing the different definitions of SBU used across the
Executive Branch agencies).
78
CUI TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 7.
79
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–458, 118
Stat. 3638 (2004).
80
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–458, §
1016(d)(1), 118 Stat. 3638, 3666 (2004).
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Environment (“ISE”), which initially only handled the sharing of terrorism‐related
information.81 In addition, IRTPA also established the Information Sharing
Council to assist the President with his new tasks.82 Although its informational
scope was limited to terrorism information, IRTPA’s ISE implementation outline
provided a foundation from which EO 13556 could base its goals and structure.83
On December 16, 2005, President George W. Bush, through a
memorandum,84 issued guidelines to aid in information sharing85 as specified in
section 1016(d) of IRTPA.86 The guidelines issued in the memorandum, while
meant only for terrorism‐related SBU information,87 would again be reflected in
the goals of EO 13556.
Specifically, Guideline Three called for the
standardization of SBU procedures across the federal government.88 Guideline
Three instructed that the “Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney
General, in coordination with the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy, and
the DNI [Director of National Intelligence], shall submit to the President for
approval recommendations for the standardization of SBU procedures for
homeland security information, law enforcement information, and terrorism
information . . . .”89 The following year, in October 2006, the SBU Coordinating
Committee began development of a Guideline Three Report.90 The Committee
consulted with National Archives and Records Administration’s (“NARA”)
Information Security Oversight Office (“ISOO”) and other federal offices
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Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–458, §
1016(b)(1), 118 Stat. 3638, 3665 (2004).
82
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–458, §§
1016(g)(1)–(2), 118 Stat. 3638, 3668 (2004).
83
See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–458, §
1016(b)(2), 118 Stat. 3638, 3665 (2004) (listing the attributes of information sharing).
84
Memorandum on Guidelines and Requirements in Support of the Information Sharing
Environment, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1874 (Dec. 16, 2005).
85
See id. at 1875–78. The guidelines outlined were as follows: (1) Define Common
Standards for How Information is Acquired, Accessed, Shared, and Used Within the ISE;
(2) Develop a Common Framework for the Sharing of Information Between and Among
Executive Departments and Agencies and State, Local, and Tribal Governments, Law
Enforcement Agencies, and the Private Sector; (3) Standardize Procedures for Sensitive
But Unclassified Information; (4) Facilitate Information Sharing Between Executive
Departments and Agencies and Foreign Partners; and (5) Protect the Information
Privacy Rights and Other Legal Rights of Americans.
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Id. at 1873.
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Id.
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Id. at 1877.
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Id.
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ADMIN.,
http://www.archives.gov/cui/chronology.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2011).
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alongside state, local, tribal, and private sector partners during the development
of the Guideline Three Report.91
Seven months later, on May 7, 2008, President Bush signed a new
memorandum (“Bush CUI Memorandum”) that adopted CUI as the single
designator for all SBU information within the ISE.92 It also established the CUI
Framework93 for designating, marking, safeguarding, and disseminating CUI
terrorism‐related information. Further, it selected NARA as the EA, giving it the
power and responsibility to oversee and ensure the implementation of the
memorandum’s directives.94 NARA’s dedication to information and document
preservation and objectivity made it an ideal candidate for the new
responsibilities.95 Three distinct categorizations of CUI were established by the
Bush CUI Memorandum: Controlled with Standard Dissemination,96 Controlled
with Specific Dissemination,97 and Controlled Enhanced with Specific
Dissemination.98
Furthermore, the Bush CUI Memorandum established the CUI Council as
the primary general advisor to NARA on issues relating to the CUI Framework.99
The CUI Council also assisted in developing the procedures, guidelines, and
standards necessary to implement and maintain the goals of the new CUI
Framework.100 In addition, it ensured coordination among the departments and

91

Id.
Bush CUI Memorandum, supra note 20, at para. 2(b) (“A uniform and more
standardized governmentwide framework for what has previously been known as SBU
information is essential for the ISE to succeed.”).
93
"CUI Framework" refers to the single set of policies and procedures governing the
designation, marking, safeguarding, and dissemination of CUI terrorism‐related
information that originates in departments and agencies, regardless of the medium
used for the display, storage, or transmittal of such information. Id. at para. 3(c).
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Id. at para. 21.
95
OMB WATCH, CUI REFORM, supra note 56, at 6.
96
Bush CUI Memorandum, supra note 20, at para. 7(b)(i) (“[T]he information requires
standard safeguarding measures that reduce the risks of unauthorized or inadvertent
disclosure. Dissemination is permitted to the extent that it is reasonably believed that it
would further the execution of a lawful or official purpose.”).
97
Id. at para. 7(b)(ii) (“[T]he information requires safeguarding measures that reduce
the risks of unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure. Material contains additional
instructions on what dissemination is permitted.”).
98
Id. at para. 7(b)(iii) (“[T]he information requires safeguarding measures more
stringent than those normally required since the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure
would create risk of substantial harm. Material contains additional instructions on what
dissemination is permitted.”).
99
Id. at para. 23(a).
100
Id. at para. 23(b).
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agencies participating in the CUI Framework.101 Exceptions to information that
could be categorized as CUI were also enumerated.102 Concurrent with the Bush
CUI Memorandum, the Archivist of the United States established the CUI Office
within NARA to carry out the newly‐established responsibilities.103
President Barack Obama, in his May 27, 2009, Presidential Memorandum
on “Classified Information and Controlled Unclassified Information” (“Obama CUI
Memorandum”), called for agencies to consider new measures, in addition to
those listed in the Bush CUI Memorandum, “to further and expedite agencies'
implementation of appropriate frameworks for standardized treatment of SBU
information and information sharing.”104 To aid in this process, the Obama CUI
Memorandum established the Presidential Task Force on Controlled Unclassified
Information (“CUI Task Force”), which was given ninety days to assemble and
submit to President Obama its recommendations on how the Executive Branch
should proceed with respect to the CUI Framework and the ISE.105 The CUI Task
Force released its report in August 2009.106 On November 4, 2010, President
Obama issued Executive Order 13556, incorporating key elements of the CUI
Task Force Report and broadening the scope of CUI to include all SBU
information within the Executive Branch.107
IV. DUTIES UNDER EO 13556
Part of the focus of this article is the challenges facing by the federal
government and its partners that currently hinder an effective, economically
sound implementation of EO 13556. Therefore, it is critical to understand the
requirements that EO 13556 places against the affected executive agencies,
NARA as the EA, and the private and other governmental partners working with
the federal government.
A. Departmental/Agency Duties
Effective implementation of EO 13556 begins with the heads of the
agencies within the Executive Branch.108 The agency heads provide the first level
of analysis to determine the development of the new, standardized CUI
101
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CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION OFFICE 1 (2008).
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Obama CUI Memorandum, supra note 27, § 2(a).
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categories.109 The head of every executive agency must review all of the
categories and markings110 used by the agency to denote CUI.111 These various
markings and categorizations include information that needs to be safeguarded
as well as that which requires dissemination controls.112 Upon reviewing the
markings and categorizations, each agency head must submit to NARA a catalog
of the proposed categories and their associated markings to be used within the
agency.113 Each category and subcategory must then be defined, along with its
basis in law, regulation, policy for safeguarding or need for dissemination
control.114 The agency heads must accomplish these duties within 180 days115 of
the signing of EO 13556 and must later submit to NARA a “proposed plan for
compliance with the requirements of this order, including the establishment of
interim target dates.”116
B. National Archives and Records Administration
NARA has the duty of ensuring the goals of EO 13556 are properly
implemented.117 Once the executive agencies submit their proposed CUI
categories and markings and are consulted by NARA, the CUI Office must
approve, in a timely manner, the new CUI categorizations that will be uniformly
applied throughout the Executive Branch.118 This approval lays the groundwork
for all future categorization; in theory, agencies and the public should
immediately know how accessible a piece of CUI is based on its categorization
without having to worry about agency‐specific markings and/or dissemination
rules. In addition, the CUI Office has the authority under EO 13556 to develop
and issue directives necessary for its implementation, and EO 13556 calls on
NARA to consider the suggestions outlined by the CUI Task Force Report.119
These suggestions, such as establishing a marking’s “life cycle”120 or providing
incentives for the proper handling of CUI, help NARA identify the concerns of the
109

See id.
See CUI TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 33–34 for a list of markings currently in
use.
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Id. § 4(b).
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See CUI TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 20–21 (describing “life cycle” as the
length of time that a piece of CUI receives safeguarding and dissemination controls
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affected agencies and allow for development of responsive directives.
Consistent with the deadline imposed on the other executive agencies, NARA has
180 days to issue the initial directives for implementation of EO 13556.121
In addition to assuming the responsibilities of category approval and
directive issuances, NARA is assigned several additional duties under EO
13556.122 Convened and chaired by NARA, interagency meetings are to be held
to review and discuss the program established by EO 13556.123 Furthermore, a
public CUI registry listing the authorized categories and markings, as well as the
applicable safeguarding, dissemination, and decontrol procedures, is to be
created within one year of the date of the signing of EO 13556.124
The interagency meetings will afford an opportunity for individual
agencies to address implementation challenges and concerns they may have
with the new standardization process. Hence, agencies like those found in
Hypothetical One, can voice their concerns about CUI sharing and the possible
consequences should certain pieces of CUI be leaked to those not authorized for
access. The public registry to be created will allow both the public and agencies
to understand the meaning of the new categorizations and how accessible a
certain piece of CUI will be, given its marking. For example, the citizen seeking
the blast maps in Hypothetical Two will know, based on the documents’ CUI
markings, how accessible to him the documents will be and whether a FOIA
request likely will be worth his time. Further, the procedures for safeguarding,
dissemination, and decontrol to be included in the registry will give agencies
clear directive on how CUI is to be handled for both intergovernmental and
public access purposes.125
NARA must also consult with representatives of state, local, and tribal
partners, and with private sector representatives, on matters relating to its
categorical approval and directive issuance responsibilities.126
Such
consultations provide government partners direct access to the EA as well as an
opportunity to understand the new standardization and clarify the
implementation duties to be undertaken. After all agencies’ compliance plans
have been reviewed and those agencies and the Office of Management and
Budget have been consulted, NARA will establish deadlines for implementation
of EO 13556’s directives.127 Finally, NARA has a regular reporting requirement to
121
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keep the Government updated on the implementation efforts of the affected
agencies.128
C. Other Select Provisions
Aside from the duties specifically directed toward agencies and NARA, EO
13556 provides special individual authority to the DNI.129 The DNI, after
consulting with the heads of the affected agencies, may issue directives and
guidelines necessary to implement EO 13556 with respect to intelligence and
intelligence‐related information.130 This special provision provides another layer
of oversight by allowing the DNI to implement extra procedures to ensure the
most sensitive CUI is properly protected.
Furthermore, EO 13556 establishes a presumption of “non‐CUI
designation” when there is doubt about a particular piece of information’s need
for safeguarding or dissemination control.131 That is, if there is a question of
whether the level of sensitivity warrants a CUI categorization, that piece of
information will default to a “normal,” or non‐CUI, non‐classified status. Such
status, in theory, affords a piece of information the ability to be disseminated to
the public or shared among federal agencies without delay. A final and crucial
provision addressing execution of EO 13556 provides that implementation shall
only take place upon the availability of appropriations.132
V. CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTATION
Theoretically, EO 13556 will increase openness across the government,
but the challenges in implementing EO 13556 will likely delay complete,
successful realization of its goals for an indefinite amount of time. The parties
affected by the implementation of EO 13556 will face staffing, training, and fiscal
challenges while attempting to safeguard their sensitive information and carry
out their missions.

128

Id. § 5(c). (“In each of the first 5 years following the date of this order and biennially
thereafter, the Executive Agent shall publish a report on the status of agency
implementation of this order.”)
129
Id. § 6(b).
130
Id.
131
Id. § 3(b).
132
Id. § 6(e). As will be discussed in the remainder of the paper, funding for the
undertaking of EO 13556’s directives will likely pose a major challenge to its
implementation.
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A. Departmental/Agency Training and Personnel
Proper training is the first line of defense in protecting CUI. Every
executive agency that handles CUI has its own management procedures and
markings for the material, and its personnel have been trained in an agency‐
specific manner in the proper analysis, marking, and safeguarding of its
information.133 For example, the CUI Task Force identified many current
categorizations specific to the DoD.134 At the same time, it identified
information specific to federal grand juries, as well as trade secrets and sensitive
business information that needs to be protected.135 Various combinations of
these types of information can exist across any agency at a given time, and,
depending on the levels of safeguarding appropriate to each agency‐specific
category, different treatment is required to assure the different categories of
information are adequately protected.136 Agencies’ information management
personnel will need to be trained in the use of the forthcoming new categories
to ensure proper marking and continued protection of the information. The
different types of CUI and the need for specific dissemination controls are
illustrated in Hypotheticals One and Two.
To ensure that standardization is achieved, standardized training must be
provided to all security professionals overseeing CUI categorization.137 NARA
must ensure that the new basic training is geared toward an information‐sharing
perspective and not hindered by individual agency‐tailored training programs.
Each agency will need to expend the appropriate amount of funding to secure
proper training and, in the event that additional employees are needed to
oversee the categorization process, more tax dollars must be expended to this
end.138 However, agencies are not free to work with an unlimited budget. The
CUI Task Force first recognized the challenges to funding in its report to
President Obama in August 2009, acknowledging that “Full implementation of
the CUI Framework requires significant resources . . . .”139
133

See CUI TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 5.
Id. at 33–34.
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See Info. Security Oversight Office, 2009 Cost Report 3, (2010),
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costs, the costs of “Security Management, Oversight, and Planning” and “Classification
Management,” two categories closely related to CUI, have increased sharply and
steadily, respectively.
139
CUI TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 25 (emphasis supplied).
134

186

U. MIAMI NAT’L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. [Vol. 1

EO 13556’s goal of standardization of CUI is frustrated by the real‐world
fact that different agencies’ missions and specific categories of CUI will in fact
require customized training. Complicating factors in uniform training—and
therefore, uniform implementation—are evident in the CUI Task Force Report:
Each agency should be encouraged to create training that is tailored to
its particular needs and mission. This is especially true in the ISE
agencies, where the tension between sharing and protecting critical
information is greatest. Training in this area requires a strong emphasis
on the exercise of individual judgment in ensuring that the CUI
Framework does not have a chilling effect on information sharing . . .
The EA should establish a baseline training program sufficient to
educate federal employees on the key principles underlying the CUI
Framework . . . Intermediate and advanced level training should be
developed by agencies, in consultation with the EA, to address
increased requirements for expertise and sophistication in managing
CUI.140

Another important aspect that is not addressed specifically within EO
13556 is that of retroactive recategorization. EO 13556 did not specify the
responsibilities of agencies for marking pieces of information which already have
an agency‐specific categorization. In its recommendations to President Obama,
the CUI Task Force addressed this issue and determined that material which was
previously printed, disseminated, or otherwise categorized, should not be
remarked and left the recategorization of material that continues to be
disseminated to the discretion of the individual agency.141 Neither EO 13556
nor the CUI Task Force Report details why such discretion is left to the agencies.
Given the federal government’s desire to maintain relations with local,
state, tribal, and private sector partners while ensuring CUI protection,142 the CUI
Task Force may have allowed agencies to retain individual discretion concerning
the remarking of previously‐categorized CUI in order to facilitate these partners’
progressive transition into the new standardized CUI schema. However, this
stymies the EO 13556’s goal of standardization, as new categories will exist
alongside the older markings still in use with various agencies. Agency and
government partner personnel working with both sets of categories must then
essentially perform a duty delineated to NARA: place the old information within
the correct new category to ensure the appropriate level of protection and
shareability. This problem can be mitigated with proper training of agency
140
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personnel by NARA, but this may not be the case where a governmental partner
has not had the benefit of new training regarding the new marking schema.
The CUI Task Force has left determinations of employee incentives and
sanctions to the discretion of the agencies.143 They are directed to consider
employee performance under the CUI Framework in promotion and award
decisions and are guided to impose administrative sanctions for non‐compliance
with CUI, safeguarding, or dissemination control standards.144 Remiss in this
regard, EO 13556 neither addresses how federal employees should be evaluated
nor outlines how sanctions should be imposed for violations. Any agency that is
lax145 in its enforcement sanctions or that does not consider CUI policy violations
equally as seriously as other security violations hinders implementation of EO
13556 and frustrates the efforts of other agencies and their employees to
properly carry out its directives.
B. National Archives and Records Administration
William J. Bosanko, director of NARA’s CUI Office and former director of
its ISOO, carries out the responsibilities of EO 13556, Executive Order 13526, and
12829, as amended.146 Recognizing the vast categorizations of CUI, Bosanko and
his office will shoulder the task of narrowing down the “wild, wild West” 147 of
currently existing markings into a smaller, standardized group.
The challenge to NARA is to create a new schema that will ensure sharing
across the government and with the public while affording the proper level of
protection to every piece of CUI. Essentially, the CUI Office must take over 100
different markings and condense them into a few new categories that will cover
all CUI across the government.148 To help frame this problem, consider the CUI
in Hypothetical One as fitting into “New Category X,” but the CUI in Hypothetical
Two does not fit well into New Category X and cannot be assigned to any other
category. The problem with a “mal‐fitting” piece of CUI is that an agency will be
posed with either overprotecting, to ensure security, or underprotecting, to
143
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adequately trained staff to ensure compliance with EO 13556.
146
Director, Information Security Oversight Office, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN.,
http://www.archives.gov/isoo/about/director.html (last visited May 8, 2011).
147
Sean Reilly, Executive Order Tightens Rule on “Controlled Unclassified” Info, FEDERAL
TIMES,
Nov.
16,
2010,
http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20101116/AGENCY03/11160302/.
148
While there is no “magical” number of categories, creating too many categories
recreates the original problem.
144

188

U. MIAMI NAT’L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. [Vol. 1

ensure shareability and wider dissemination. Because each agency currently
marks such information in its own specific manner, NARA will have to create a
marking applicable to multiple CUI designations across many agencies. NARA
must design a system which can protect the CUI in both hypotheticals while
ensuring its shareability with the public and across the government.
Given the sheer quantity of information and affected agencies,149 the CUI
Office will need to expand its operation and manpower if it is to successfully
oversee the implementation of EO 13556.150 In fact, the CUI Office only has ten
full‐time employees;151 given the mammoth task EO 13556 assigns to NARA,
more manpower will be required to achieve full, effective implementation.
Bosanko is not confident that EO 13556 would reduce the amount of information
designated as CUI.152 Furthermore, Bosanko also recognizes that the modern
structure for handling information in the federal sector has changed
significantly,153 and his office is now in charge of “potentially more data than
exists in classified files.”154 As NARA works to publish a public registry to
catalogue the new CUI categories,155 Bosanko’s office will be working with the
various agencies across the Executive Branch to determine which documents
need the protection of the CUI Framework.156
As the EA, NARA is the natural “go‐to” source for categorization
questions that an agency’s information managers are unable to answer.
Additionally, individual agencies will look to NARA to provide critical training to
149

See Aftergood, supra note 1, at 401–02 (describing how classification—and
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meet the new directives. The need for an expanded staff to provide sufficient
expertise and manpower to oversee the implementation of EO 13556 will
require more funding. The CUI Task Force, aware of this critical need because of
the “extraordinary efforts”157 required of the EA, made a point to denote the
vital role the EA would serve and its need to be “appropriately resourced.”158 An
approximate estimate of funding159 and staffing160 required for implementation
remains elusive as no figures are available at this time. There is little doubt,
however, that NARA, faced with the daunting task of successfully carrying out EO
13556, will need to expand to accomplish its duties.161
C. State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Partners
EO 13556 reaches out to entities beyond the federal government.162
State, local, tribal, and private sector partners will be expected to assist in
protecting CUI that the government has entrusted them to access (and to
provide) in their capacity as partners of the federal government.163 Like the
executive agencies, many of these partners have been in business with the
federal government for many years and have developed their own practices of
marking and information dissemination.164 Those that own or handle CUI that
are subject to the new standardized marking system will need to revisit their
policies and practices to ensure compliance under EO 13556 and all other
applicable law.
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These partners will be under the same strain as the executive agencies in
training employees and in understanding how the CUI they handle should be
categorized and to whom it may be disseminated. While the partners are being
consulted by NARA, unlike the executive agencies,165 they will not be able to
submit their own categories, and these partners must adapt any former
“partner‐specific”166 markings to match those the EA dictates. Furthermore,
these partners may be caught in the confusion resulting from the marking
initiation process; as agencies decide, at their discretion,167 whether to apply
new categorical markings to existing CUI, government partners must be ready to
properly handle the newly‐marked forms to assure their protection.
D. Entrenched Institutional Bias Against Information Sharing
The CUI Task Force’s recommendation does not adequately address the
fact that different agencies may have different ideas concerning the kind of
information that needs to be safeguarded.168 This can hinder sharing, based on
the various types of information handled, the size of the agencies across the
Executive Branch, and the various missions of the agencies.169 Moreover,
agencies must overcome their deeply‐rooted “agency‐centric”170 historic
practices and gear their information management style to an Executive Branch‐
wide sharing style.171
Part of the mission of agencies across the Executive Branch, especially
those in the intelligence community, is to train and deploy agents specifically to
gather information from sources and report that information back to their home
165
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offices for analysis.172 CUI issues may arise when an agent, working on behalf of
his agency, returns sensitive information back to his home office where,
subsequently, there is disagreement among those at various levels of the
organization concerning how the agent’s original information should be
categorized. Agencies generally default to protectionist practices when it comes
to categorizing and sharing information,173 a practice deeply rooted in decades‐
old, agency‐specific policies174 designed to protect the interests of the agencies
and their missions. Indeed, sharing information has long been viewed as a
“career stopper” for agents.175 Information originating in or under the control of
an employee’s home agency, which is then shared and subsequently
inadvertently disclosed or otherwise compromised due to the receiving agency’s
carelessness, can have severe negative consequences on that employee’s
career.176
In addition, problems arise in agency‐specific circumstances where
protecting a source is critical to ensuring that the source continues to supply the
agency with information.177 This area of contention regarding information
sharing originates in an agency’s culture, which can best be thought of as the
inverse of Hypothetical Two. In this inverse hypothetical, a source from Country
X is providing information—for example, the location of munitions stores—to an
agency or a contact working on behalf of a specific agency. Having expended
great amounts of time and funding seeking out and developing this source, the
agency would naturally is loathe to risk compromising its source. Should news
break in the United States or abroad of covert actions taking place in Country X,
the source may “dry up.” Agencies, therefore, are uneasy sharing information
whose dissemination to the wrong individual could compromise the mission or,
at worst, cause the death of sources providing intelligence to U.S. agents.
Finally, the history of SBU reveals instances where agencies have
demonstrated a bias against information sharing.178 For example, in 1992, NIST
172
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emphasized that information “owners,” not [government computer] system
operators, should set the level of protection their information requires.179 This
agency‐specific deference allows agencies to determine CUI protection
classifications independent of other agencies, contributing to the growing
number of individual agency CUI markings. Further bias against information
sharing is demonstrated by DoD Regulation 5200.1,180 which limits dissemination
of “For Official Use Only” (“FOUO”) material181 stating:
FOUO information may be disseminated within the DoD Components
and between officials of the DoD Components and DoD contractors,
consultants, and grantees as necessary in the conduct of official
business. FOUO information may also be released to officials in other
Departments and Agencies of the Executive and Judicial Branches in
performance of a valid Government function.182

An employee handling FOUO under this directive will be inclined to share
FOUO with other Components of the DoD but will not do so upon the request of
a non‐DoD agency without first confirming that the other agency or government
branch requesting the information is doing so for a “valid Government function.”
This term was not defined by DoD Regulation 5200.1. Utilizing Hypothetical One,
the same DoD employee will share the requested CUI with the other agency if it
is a part of DoD, but initially will not until the other agency’s request is deemed
to be a “valid function.”
E. The “Mosaic Theory”
The idea that small bits and fragments of seemingly unimportant
information can be combined to form an accurate “big picture” is known as the
“Mosaic Theory.”183 If an enemy of the United States possessed the CUI
discussed in Hypothetical One, he would know that, to ensure maximum carnage
and structural damage, he should focus his attack on the Pentagon to target a
wedge that does not contain the blast‐proof windows described in the CUI.
Perhaps an enemy would be less likely to launch an attack if some essential
information were not available to use in formulating the attack plan, either as
single piece of CUI, or as an aggregate of many pieces of CUI strung together.
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The Mosaic Theory is defined as:
Disparate items of information, though individually of limited or no
utility to their possessor, can take on added significance when
combined with other items of information. Combining the items
illuminates their interrelationships and breeds analytic synergies, so
that the resulting mosaic of information is worth more than the sum of
its parts.184

The intense focus on national security since the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks
creates a perfect setting for agencies to employ the Mosaic Theory as a means of
withholding pieces of information from disclosure.185 The Mosaic Theory
presents a fundamental challenge to transparency and the free flow of
information sought by EO 13556; its greatest effect is on FOIA, a primary means
for disclosure of government information.186
The concerns raised by the Mosaic Theory can be applied to CUI across
the Executive Branch. Under the Mosaic Theory, the “appropriate unit of risk
assessment” is the mosaic which could be formed should the piece of
information in question be obtained by an adversary.187 Government agencies
have called upon Mosaic Theory concerns to classify documents at higher levels
of sensitivity and to avoid disclosing documents for a variety of reasons.188
These concerns have created a nearly unbeatable defense to disclosing
documents and will prove to be a substantial challenge to the free flow of
information called for by the Obama Administration.189
Nevertheless, a member of the public seeking CUI may choose to utilize a
FOIA request to gain access to the information sought. When citizens and
organizations seeking information take the appropriate steps to petition the
government for release of desired information, EO 13556 stipulates that the
“mere fact that information is designated as CUI shall not have a bearing on
[disclosure] determinations . . . .”190 This fact is crucial when considering how
federal courts have ruled on FOIA claims in the past when agencies exert a
defense based upon the Mosaic Theory. FOIA directs the United States District
Courts to grant “substantial weight” when considering an agency’s affidavit of

184

Id.
Id.
186
Id. at 632.
187
Id. at 633.
188
See id. at 630 (stating that government agencies have used Mosaic Theory concerns
to avoid FOIA and avoid pretrial discovery requests).
189
See id. at 678–79; Goodwin, supra note 17, at 206–07.
190
EO 13,556, supra note 19, § 2(b).
185

194

U. MIAMI NAT’L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. [Vol. 1

items to be kept secret under proper authority.191 FOIA then affords agencies
the same power to withhold disclosure of items recognized as CUI under EO
13556 through its enumerated exceptions.192 Despite this directive, courts
attempt to decide cases independently and without affording so much deference
as to impede the exercise of justice.193
Federal courts, however, have been reluctant to probe agency
explanations for the withholding of information on national security grounds.194
When granting “substantial weight” to protected information, courts reason that
agency expertise and their own lack of experience in dealing with national
security matters affords the agency the right to prevent the disclosure of the
information in question.195 Although many of these claims are related to
Exemption One of FOIA,196 agencies can assert a claim for nondisclosure based
on the Mosaic Theory that the release of CUI could help to build a picture that
could be used to develop a threat to national security.197
Similar to the challenge of agency bias against information sharing,
challenges to implementation under the Mosaic Theory have existed throughout
the history of SBU.198 In response to a March 19, 2002, White House
Memorandum, NARA’s ISOO and the Department of Justice’s Office of
Information and Privacy issued a memorandum (“NARA Memorandum”)199
urging agencies to consider FOIA Exemptions Two200 and Four201 when
determining whether to categorize information as SBU.202 Within the same
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memorandum, the two offices cautioned that protecting sensitive information
“from inappropriate disclosure should be carefully considered, on a case‐by‐case
basis, together with the benefits that result from the open and efficient exchange
of scientific, technical, and like information.”203 Along the same lines, in October
2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a memorandum (“Ashcroft
Memorandum”)204 instructing agencies to consider the interests the Bush
Administration was committed to protecting when making discretionary
disclosure decisions under FOIA.205 In addition to changing the standard to
which the Department of Justice would defend agency nondisclosure decisions
under FOIA,206 the Ashcroft Memorandum stated, “Such protection efforts [for
critical infrastructure information], of course, must at the same time include the
protection of any agency information that could enable someone to succeed in
causing the feared harm.”207
The language employed in both the NARA and Ashcroft Memoranda
alludes to Mosaic Theory concerns; both memoranda call on agencies to
consider outside information associated with a piece of CUI that is under request
for disclosure.208 Given the tendency of agencies to overprotect and the Bush
Administration’s reputation for secrecy in national security policy, agencies likely
chose to withhold CUI from disclosure unless absolutely necessary. Like
agencies’ institutional bias against information sharing, these historical hurdles
must be overcome to ensure effective implementation of CUI.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
As discussed, agencies have several concerns when it comes to sharing
information with other agencies and the public, and these concerns will give
pause to a security professional attempting to apply the most appropriate
categorization to a piece of CUI. The vast amount of CUI documents across the
Executive Branch will not all fit neatly into the various categories prescribed by
NARA; some CUI will occupy a grey area that perplexes those who categorize a
document and can potentially stifle its shareability between agencies and/or
release to the public. Whether this inability to accurately assign a category
comes from the contents of the CUI itself or from a lack of training or manpower,
203
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it is crucial to find an appropriate category so the CUI can be properly
safeguarded and disseminated.
A. Interagency Review Committee
During the past fifty years, various committees and commissions209 have
attempted to expose and rectify the problem of excessive overclassification—
and therefore, the lack of public access—in the government but were largely
ignored or produced only nominal effect.210 However, a few of these bodies
were successful and produced clear results.211 The same need for transparency
in and shareability of classified material across the government applies to CUI as
well. In this section, recommendations to further ensure the most successful
implementation of EO 13556 are elaborated.
The duration of classification and overclassification of information have
long been issues of concern within the federal government.212 In response to
agency decisions not to declassify a document, the Interagency Security
Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) was established to consider appeals from the
public whose requests for declassification review were denied.213 In 2009 alone,
ISCAP declassified in full or in part sixty‐nine percent of the documents appealed
requesting declassication.214 This figure remains consistent with the years
preceding 2009, as ISCAP has declassified in whole or in part sixty‐five percent of
the documents, which were appealed for a declassification decision.215 The
surprise success of ISCAP, composed of Executive Branch officials, including
those with the greatest interests in information security—the Department of
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Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council216—
proved to the federal government that a multiagency appellate body could
effectively curtail the tendency of agencies to overprotect their information.
ISCAP demonstrates that, unlike the federal courts,217 an individual
seeking access to information has the odds in favor of gaining access to some or
all of the information sought.218 To properly address any CUI issues that may
arise, the EA should establish a council like ISCAP—a “CUI Review Committee”—
to hear a contested CUI categorization, either between the public and an agency
or within an agency when it cannot assign an appropriate CUI category to a piece
of CUI because of fears of the Mosaic Theory, unauthorized interception, loss of
agency prestige, etc. Such a committee would effectively resolve any
categorization or disclosure request problems in a neutral manner, allowing the
appropriate balance to be struck between CUI protection and public access. The
greatest advantage of an ISCAP model is that many executive agencies are
represented, including those most concerned with protecting CUI and classified
information, and can consider the request free of undue bias of the originating
agency.
The decision reached by the CUI Review Committee, therefore, would
reflect the decision of the Executive Branch agencies as a whole without fear of a
particular agency’s culture driving the result of the categorization. The CUI
Review Committee could also serve as a forum for Executive Branch agencies to
voice concerns and articulate suggestions to NARA. An alternative to forming a
new CUI Review Committee, based on the success of ISCAP’s declassification
efforts throughout its existence, is the establishment of a second branch of
ISCAP whose mission would be to resolve CUI‐related issues. Either solution will
likely grant the public access an improved process for access to information that
Obama Administration and EO 13556 aim to provide.
B. Mandatory “Decategorization” Reviews
ISCAP spends much of its time reviewing Mandatory Declassification
Reviews (“MDR”).219 MDR has proven to be a successful program; from 1996
216
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through 2009, ninety‐one percent of all requests were either wholly or partially
declassified.220 Such a rate of declassification increases public accessibility to
previously unavailable material, and agencies, aware that the material has
undergone MDR, share information without apprehension that the disseminated
material will impact their missions. The proposed CUI Review Committee (or an
expanded ISCAP) should process “decategorization” reviews to provide an
inquiring public with the information it requests.
The mission of the CUI Review Committee should be to always strive for
“smart” decategorization. To support the Obama Administration’s call for
openness, the CUI Review Committee will aim to make as much CUI accessible as
possible, but it must use its collective expertise to regulate which material
appropriate for dissemination even in the face of a president’s call for
unprecedented transparency.221 Finally, if the CUI Review Committee finds that
sharing and public access to information is stymied by the lack of an appropriate
category, it must also have the power to solicit NARA to create the needed
category. That is, if the CUI Review Committee finds that the CUI in Hypothetical
One does not fit into any of the new categories created by NARA, it would then
propose a new category with specifications for safeguarding and dissemination
controls to be considered by NARA. Thus, the CUI Review Committee serves as a
second safety net to ensure CUI is neither overprotected nor undercategorized.
C. Standardized Sanctions and Incentives
To ensure the uniform adherence of the EO 13556 directives across the
government, each agency its employees must have an equal interest in the
proper protection, marking, and goals of the new CUI schema. Agencies may
achieve this status by adopting the recommendation of the CUI Task Force in
regarding incentives and sanctions for employees.222 In addition, once NARA’s
deadlines for implementation of the new CUI categorizations are determined,
NARA must have some form of redress against agencies that repeatedly
overprotect information where there is no compelling need.
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D. Training Uniformity
NARA will play a critical role in establishing training programs for
information managers and the employees they oversee. Managers trained in EO
13556 compliance must successfully apply NARA’s training within their own
agency’s culture without compromising its mission. The CUI Task Force
recognizes that different levels of instruction are required based upon agency
missions and employee duties and seniority.223 Furthermore, the CUI Task Force
recommends uniform “baseline” training, with agency training at the
intermediate and advanced level to be coordinated between the individual
agencies and the EA.224 Finally, the CUI Task Force Reports suggests that
agencies should be allowed to tailor their own training programs to meet the
particular needs of their missions.225
NARA should take a more active role in developing training programs that
can be uniformly applied to agencies across the Executive Branch; indeed, it
must go beyond the CUI Task Force’s recommendation and structure training
programs that help ensure the maximum amount of CUI access is achieved. To
accomplish this, NARA must have some influence over the training of
intermediate and top‐level government personnel in regard to the information
sharing goals of EO 13556. More effective implementation also can be achieved
by consulting agencies to identify their concerns about CUI and, consequently,
developing a program that will instruct all employees at every level of seniority
to effectively mark and share information. At every level of seniority, NARA’s
training should emphasize that the greatest level of CUI control should be
employed only when absolutely necessary.
NARA should pay special attention of how CUI is marked and
disseminated at different levels within agencies and then offer standardized
instruction across all agencies to groupings of employees with similar levels of
seniority. This allows individuals working in the same environment to be trained
identically, allowing employees to exercise an “educated” individual judgment
through benefit of standardized training. By implementing a uniform training
program at every level of seniority, all agencies will receive identical instruction
and seek to meet the goals of EO 13556 with minimum influence exerted by
agency culture or bias.226
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Finally, each agency handling CUI should have an individual who oversees
and ensures NARA training standards are not impeded by agency culture. To
ensure the most effective implementation under EO 13556, NARA must have
training oversight authority over these federal employees. Initially, NARA may
draw these individuals from the agencies themselves. However, in order to
prevent any unnecessary agency bias from affecting EO 13556’s implementation,
information managers must eventually be trained from the “ground up” by
NARA and then be assigned as detailees to the agencies handling CUI.
E. National Archives and Records Administration
The sheer volume of information that qualifies as CUI across the federal
government is enormous. To address the challenges it faces as EO 13556’s EA,
NARA must expand its staff to a level adequate to efficiently handle the
workload. At this time, it is difficult to determine how many additional
personnel will be required as NARA’s duties as EA continue to develop and new
directives are issued to facilitate implementation and compliance. The CUI Task
Force concluded that, should the scope of CUI be expanded as it suggested,
NARA would “need to provide extraordinary support to non‐ISE agencies to
ensure effective implementation of the CUI Framework.”227 EO 13556 expanded
the scope of what constitutes CUI,228 and, accordingly, NARA must be
appropriately funded to carry out its mission, offer competitive salaries to attract
the best public‐sector information managers to its staff, and provide for the
vehicles of implementation EO 13556 requires.
F. Notification to Non‐federal Partners
An important part of fostering a continued understanding of CUI between
the government and its partners, is keeping all the affected parties informed of
new developments in CUI procedures. After the new CUI categories are
established, each individual agency should adopt a “remarking” policy and
associated deadline and should inform its government partners of the effective
date of the changes. Timely notice will allow partners to immediately begin
retraining their employees and formatting their marking programs to reflect
changes in the marking categories of any CUI produced or owned by the partner.
Agencies should therefore determine and announce their own implementation
dates once they are certain their staff and resources can effectively mark,
protect, and communicate the changes to their non‐federal partners.
To facilitate the transition to using the new set of markings, agencies
need to begin using the new categories as soon as possible and must ascertain
227
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that their partners are aware of the absolute implementation deadlines229
imposed by NARA. Early adoption of the new categories allows employees more
time when becoming accustomed to the new categorizations and protections. In
addition, upon implementation of the new categorizations, the executive
agencies will need to communicate with their partners immediately to prevent
CUI from being underprotected or overprotected by use of the former
markings.230
VII. CONCLUSION
The challenges to the successful implementation of EO 13556 are
numerous and complex. Agencies must overcome their own individual
organizational biases that are resistant to information sharing while adjusting to
a new “need to share” sensitive information policy. Deeply rooted in
organizational culture, these biases favor overprotection rather than disclosure.
Simultaneously, agency employees at all levels must be trained to comply with
and further the goals of EO 13556. Meanwhile, ideas such as the Mosaic Theory
and the potential compromise of sources and methods must be addressed;
conflicts arising under the new standardized CUI schema will require an
environment in which they can be discussed and resolved by those most strongly
impacted by any decision made with regard to CUI policy. NARA must expand its
staff and funding base, as well as assume a more pivotal role in the compliance
process, from developing training programs to potentially administering
sanctions where noncompliance is costly and chronic. Finally, state, local, tribal,
and private sector government partners will need to be integrated into the new
CUI marking and safeguarding process.
Public access to government information is essential to the democratic
principles of the American Government, and the ability of agencies to share CUI
across the government plays a vital role in the national security of the United
States. EO 13556 is, in theory, a step in the right direction to accomplish the
Obama Administration’s goal of more transparency in government while
simultaneously setting up a CUI framework that will allow information to be
shared more often and more easily across the government. However, EO 13556
faces decades‐old challenges to its successful implementation, as well as fresh,
new ones‐‐‐challenges which must be overcome before success can begin to be
fully realized.

229

Id. § 5(b).
See O’Reilly, supra note 6, at 818 (suggesting that the federal government may be
slow in communicating the changes to be implemented, thereby causing withholding of
material whose release, in years past, had been routinely allowed or, conversely,
allowing release of material whose disclosure, in years past, had been prohibited).
230

